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ARTICLE 
THE NEXT GENERATION COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT 
ORIN S. KERR† 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA) to regulate government access to Internet communications and 
records. ECPA is widely regarded as outdated, and ECPA reform is now on 
the Congressional agenda. At the same time, existing reform proposals retain 
the structure of the 1986 Act and merely tinker with a few small aspects of 
the statute. This Article offers a thought experiment about what might 
happen if Congress were to repeal ECPA and enact a new privacy statute to 
replace it.  
The new statute would look quite different from ECPA because 
overlooked changes in Internet technology have dramatically altered the 
assumptions on which the 1986 Act was based. ECPA was designed for a 
network world with high storage costs and only local network access. Its 
design reflects the privacy threats of such a network, including high privacy 
protection for real-time wiretapping, little protection for noncontent records, 
and no attention to particularity or jurisdiction. Today’s Internet reverses all 
of these assumptions. Storage costs have plummeted, leading to a reality of 
almost total storage. Even U.S.-based services now serve a predominantly 
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foreign customer base. A new statute would need to account for these 
changes.  
This Article contends that a next generation privacy act should contain 
four features. First, it should impose the same requirement on access to all 
contents. Second, it should impose particularity requirements on the scope of 
disclosed metadata. Third, it should impose minimization rules on all 
accessed content. And fourth, it should impose a two-part territoriality 
regime with a mandatory rule structure for U.S.-based users and a 
permissive regime for users located abroad. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA) to govern the privacy of computer network communications.1 The 
Act grants Internet users a set of statutory privacy rights that limits the 
government’s power to access a person’s communications and records.2 
ECPA has governed Internet privacy in the U.S. for over a quarter century 
with only minor revisions.3  
In recent years, ECPA has become widely perceived as outdated.4 Sena-
tor Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
recently announced that ECPA reform is now a “top priority.”5 His coun-
terpart on the House side, Representative Robert Goodlatte, chairman of 
the House Judiciary Committee, has also endorsed the need to reform 
ECPA and recently held hearings on ECPA reform.6  
Despite the congressional interest in ECPA reform, existing reform 
proposals mostly nibble at the edges of the 1986 statute.7 Those proposals 
accept the basic structure of ECPA as fixed, and they aim to tweak privacy 
protections within the Act’s framework. This Article considers a thought 
experiment: What would the electronic communications privacy laws 
ideally look like if Congress could start from scratch and enact an entirely 
new law?  
 
1 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
2 See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 4.5–4.8(e) (3d ed. 
2007).  
3 The major changes to ECPA following 1986 are discussed infra Section I.C. 
4 See Charlie Savage, Panel Approves a Bill to Safeguard Email, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2012, at 
B7 (noting that ECPA “is widely seen as outdated”); see also Brendan Sasso, Consensus Builds for 
Requiring Warrant for Email Searches, HILL’S HILLICON VALLEY (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/289035-consensus-builds-for-requiring-
warrant-for-email-searches (quoting Representative Jim Sensenbrenner as saying that ECPA’s 
requirement of only a subpoena for access to email records is “outdated and probably unconstitu-
tional”). 
5 Brendan Sasso & Jennifer Martinez, OVERNIGHT TECH: House to Consider Email Privacy 
Bill, THE HILL’S HILLICON VALLEY (Feb. 27, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-
valley/technology/285397-overnight-tech-house-to-consider-email-privacy-bill; see also Sen. 
Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm., The Agenda of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
for the 113th Congress ( J an. 16, 2013), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/113-sjc-
agenda-speech (“[A]s Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I will keep pushing to update our 
privacy laws to address emerging technology and the Internet, including the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act and cybersecurity laws.”). 
6 See Sasso & Martinez, supra note 5 (reporting House Judiciary Committee Chairman Rob-
ert Goodlatte’s commitment to “look at modernizing the decades-old Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA) to reflect our current digital economy”).  
7 See infra Section I.D. 
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The Article contends that such a new privacy act would look quite 
different from the current ECPA. Network technologies have dramatically 
transformed since the 1980s. The extraordinary pace of technological change 
in the last quarter century means that the Internet of today bears only a 
slight resemblance to the Internet of the 1980s. Indeed, today’s Internet is 
quite different from the Internet of a decade ago, often in ways that are 
imperceptible to the user but that have profound implications for privacy 
law. If Congress could start fresh and enact a new statute, those changes 
would lead to a law very different from ECPA statute on the books today. 
Two technological changes are particularly important. First, the plum-
meting costs of storage have changed how surveillance threatens privacy.8 
ECPA was drafted at a time when electronic storage was expensive and 
therefore relatively rare. Accordingly, ECPA treated real-time wiretapping 
as the chief privacy threat. Access to stored communications was a lesser 
concern. The opposite is true today. Storage has become remarkably cheap 
and therefore ubiquitous. Service providers now routinely store everything, 
and they can turn over everything to law enforcement. As a result of this 
technological change, access to stored records has become the greater 
privacy threat. The incredible growth of stored records renders ECPA’s 
structure exactly backwards for the operation of modern computer net-
works. 
Second, the Internet has become truly global.9 ECPA was drafted when 
computer network usage was very heavily U.S.-based. The Act created 
statutory protections for U.S. users of U.S. services. Today’s network usage 
looks dramatically different: only about ten percent of the today’s global 
Internet usage involves U.S.-based individuals. 10  The overwhelming 
majority of users of Internet services such as Gmail and Facebook are based 
abroad.11 The global nature of today’s Internet creates a series of jurisdic-
tional headaches for global Internet services that might have corporate 
headquarters in one country, servers in another, and users all around the 
world.  
More than just technology has changed: new principles of constitutional 
law have emerged that alter the proper role of statutory law. In the last five 
years, courts have begun to settle the basic parameters of how the Fourth 
Amendment applies to the Internet.12 The original ECPA was designed as a 
 
8 See infra Section II.A. 
9 See infra Section II.E. 
10 See infra Section II.E. 
11 See infra Section II.E. 
12 See infra Section II.C. 
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statutory stand-in for uncertain Fourth Amendment protection. As the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection becomes more certain, however, 
the statute’s coverage may change with it.  
As a practical matter, lawmakers rarely start from scratch when passing 
legislation. Amending prior laws is the norm for a variety of reasons. But if 
Congress were forced to enact a new privacy act, that new law ideally would 
be based on four principles. First, the new statute would impose a uniform 
warrant requirement for compelled access to contents held for a customer or 
subscriber.13 The new statute would abolish ECPA’s antiquated distinctions, 
such as the difference between real-time access and stored access and the 
complex categories of coverage of the Stored Communications Act. In place 
of those distinctions, the new statute would treat all access to contents 
under the same warrant standard. 
Second, the law would enact a particularity requirement for compelled 
access to noncontent information. 14  One approach might rely on the 
concept of customer-hours. When the government obtains a court order to 
compel records, it should not be entitled to all of a user’s records—or even 
worse, all records of hundreds of users. Instead, each court order could be 
limited based on both the time coverage of the order and the number of 
users implicated. If the government seeks records associated with many 
users, it must accept the tradeoff that those records will span a shorter 
window of time. 
Third, the new law would impose minimization limitations for contents 
of communications obtained by government investigators. 15  When the 
government collects the contents of communications pursuant to a court 
order, investigators should be limited in what they can access. ECPA only 
imposes such limits for contents obtained by real-time wiretapping, reflect-
ing the traditional sense that real-time access poses the greatest privacy 
threat. The functional collapse of the distinction between real-time and 
stored access means that those limits should now apply to all contents.  
Fourth, a new law would adopt an explicit territoriality regime.16 One 
solution would be to focus on the location of the user, with full warrant 
protections for users based in the United States and a permissive  disclosure 
regime to foreign legal process for users based abroad. A global network 
demands different protections for local and foreign users. Under my 
proposal, U.S. users would receive full warrant protection regardless of the 
 
13 See infra Section III.A. 
14 See infra Section III.B. 
15 See infra Section III.C. 
16 See infra Section III.D. 
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location of servers or corporate headquarters. By contrast, U.S. providers 
should be permitted, but not required, to disclose records pursuant to 
foreign legal processes for users based in the country seeking those records.  
The argument will proceed in three parts. Part I introduces the history 
and structure of ECPA. This Part explores the computer technology that 
existed when ECPA was passed and explains how ECPA evolved in re-
sponse to that technology. Part II explains why the existing statute is based 
on outdated assumptions. Changing technology and evolving constitutional 
law have dramatically shifted the factual and legal ground on which ECPA 
was based. Part III identifies the four major principles on which a next 
generation privacy act could be based. It points the way to new principles 
based on existing network technology. 
I. THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF ECPA 
It is difficult to analyze ECPA without first understanding early Inter-
net technology. This Part begins by explaining surveillance law before 
ECPA. It then turns to the new technological problems that ECPA was 
designed to address at the time of its enactment, and it explains the basic 
structure of ECPA to see how it responded to these problems. This Part 
concludes by highlighting the limited nature of existing ECPA reform 
proposals and focusing on reforms advocated by an influential group known 
as the Digital Due Process Coalition.  
A.  Federal Surveillance Law Before ECPA 
Early federal surveillance laws began as efforts to regulate telephone 
privacy. The telephone was invented by 1880,17 and it proved to be a 
dramatic advance over communication by telegraph. But the telephone had 
a serious privacy flaw. Any person with access to the physical wires carrying 
the call could tap into the wire and intercept the call. In the early days of 
the telephone, wiretapping was rampant.18 Some state laws prohibiting 
 
17 See Christopher Beauchamp, Who Invented the Telephone? Lawyers, Patents, and the Judg-
ments of History, 51 TECH. & CULTURE 854, 855-67 (2010) (noting that patent litigation surround-
ing the telephone’s origins clouds the question of who invented the telephone). 
18 See SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 25-34 (1959) (tracing phone wiretap-
ping back to the 1890s and highlighting its growth as a practice into the 1950s); see also Heutsche 
v. United States, 414 U.S. 898, 899 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ( “[W]e live in a regime where 
the ‘dirty business' of wiretapping runs rampant.”). 
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wiretapping emerged by 1895,19 although the first federal statute did not 
arrive until the Communications Act of 1934.20 Telephone privacy laws 
naturally focused on the act of “intercepting” the call—that is, breaking in 
on the private call by installing a listening device to monitor the communi-
cation over the wires as the call was transmitted.21  
Congress maintained the focus on interception when it enacted the 
Wiretap Act in 1968.22 The Wiretap Act replaced the Communications Act 
of 1934 as the federal statute governing privacy in telephone communica-
tions. Like the Communications Act, the Wiretap Act prohibits “intercept-
ing” telephone calls between parties to a communication.23 Unlike the 
Communications Act, however, the Wiretap Act includes a carefully crafted 
privacy regime regulating lawful interceptions.24 That privacy regime was 
inspired in part by the Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. New York, 
which required any wiretapping statute to include special privacy protec-
tions against government monitoring.25 Wiretapping raised special Fourth 
Amendment concerns, Berger had indicated, because it involved “a series of 
intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable 
cause,”26 rather than the “one limited intrusion” of a traditional search into 
physical property.27 Put another way, real-time wiretapping was contempo-
raneous with transmission and therefore could collect all information sent 
over the wire. In contrast, a traditional search was a limited intrusion into a 
space to collect only what had been stored there.  
Echoing Berger, the Wiretap Act imposes a stringent warrant require-
ment for intercepting telephone calls over the wires. Interception orders can 
 
19 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46 (1967) (highlighting an 1895 Illinois law outlaw-
ing wiretapping and similar legislation enacted ten years later in California). 
20 Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–609 (1934)). 
21 For example, the relevant provision of the Communications Act of 1934 stated that “[n]o 
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or 
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted 
communication to any person.” Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1104 (codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 605 (1934)). 
22 The Wiretap Act is sometimes referred to as “Title III” because it was passed as the third 
title of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 
(1968). The Wiretap Act is codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
23 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006) (stating that anyone who “[i]ntentionally intercepts, 
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any 
wire, oral, or electronic communication” commits a crime). 
24 See id. § 2511(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (identifying exceptions when wiretapping is lawful 
without a court order); id. § 2518 (identifying procedures for lawful interception pursuant to a 
court order). 
25  388 U.S. 41, 57-60 (1967). 
26 Id. at 59. 
27 Id. at 57. 
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be obtained to conduct government monitoring, but they require a showing 
of special need, a predicate felony offense, and high-level Justice Depart-
ment or state approval.28 The Wiretap Act also includes two special rules 
for how the government must execute a wiretap. First, the government 
must engage in minimization.29 Minimization refers to the process of trying 
to limit ex ante which of a suspect’s communications the government will 
intercept.30 If an agent is listening to a wiretapped telephone line, the agent 
might engage in minimization by not listening in when the suspect speaks 
with his mother about her health problems.31  
The second requirement is a general ban on disclosure of communica-
tions intercepted or information learned from those communications unless 
appropriate to the investigation.32 Agents are not permitted to disclose 
information obtained from intercepted communications—even to other 
agents—unless it “is appropriate to the proper performance of the official 
duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure.”33 The idea is to 
treat even lawfully intercepted communications as private: the government 
must justify each use and disclosure of information, even within the gov-
ernment.34 
B.  The Office of Technology Assessment Report and the Need for ECPA 
By the mid-1980s, Congress grew concerned about new computer tele-
communications methods that fell outside the scope of existing privacy 
laws. In 1985, the now-defunct Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
published an influential report entitled Federal Government Information 
 
28 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (2006). 
29 See id. § 2518(5) (stating that a wiretapping order “shall be conducted in such a way as to 
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception”); see also 
LAFAVE ET. AL., supra note 2, § 4.6(h), at 496-97 (requiring the minimization of nonrelevant 
communications under the Wiretap Act). 
30 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.6(h), at 497 (discussing how the minimization re-
quirement “does not forbid [the] interception” of “nonpertinent communications,” but requires 
the government to take measures to lessen their interception). 
31 See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1978) (concluding that conversations 
between the defendant and her mother were reasonably intercepted by government agents); see 
also United States v. Glover, 681 F.3d 411, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that “determining the 
reasonableness of minimization efforts is a fact-specific inquiry”). 
32 See 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (2006). 
33 Id. § 2517(1). 
34 See SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 175 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that, with respect to 
material gathered from wiretapped investigations, “the USAO [United States Attorney’s Office] 
may not be authorized to provide these materials to [another] civil enforcement agency”). 
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Technology: Electronic Surveillance and Civil Liberties.35 The report noted the 
growth of communications sent over computers—specifically the advent of 
“electronic mail.”36 At that time, electronic mail took two forms. First, users 
could send messages that were then printed out and delivered in hard copy 
format either by the postal service or by a courier.37 Second, users could 
send computer-to-computer messages over the telephone lines. 38  This 
generally required use of a modem to access mainframe computers, which 
would allow users to send a message over telephone lines to a “central 
computer” where the message would wait for the recipient to access and 
download it.39  
Computer data transmissions and electronic mail raised several new 
problems not addressed by the Wiretap Act. First, the Act was largely 
telephone-specific.40 The interception of computer data transmissions was 
not prohibited by the Wiretap Act because it only protected data transmis-
sions that contained the sound of a human voice.41 Data communications 
were not protected. This issue arose in the very first federal computer crime 
case when a hacker objected to being monitored using the network he had 
successfully invaded.42 The Fourth Circuit held that such monitoring could 
not violate the Wiretap Act for several reasons, one of which was that 
 
35 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1985), available at 
http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8509.pdf [hereinafter “OTA REPORT”]. 
36 Notably, the issue of email privacy dominated the OTA REPORT’s concerns about com-
puter privacy. The Report briefly noted that computer users also could access Electronic Bulletin 
Boards, but even these were described as a form of email: 
An electronic bulletin board is an electronic mail service (or the equivalent comput-
er-based information service) with a public or private electronic mailbox that is ac-
cessible to several persons. A public bulletin board usually is open to many or all 
subscribers and/or persons with a general password. A private bulletin board is lim-
ited to persons with special passwords. 
Id. at 48. 
37 Id. at 47-48. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 48. 
40 The Wiretap Act also prohibits the interception of “oral communications,” which effec-
tively prohibits the use of secret audio recording devices to record the human voice. 18 U.S.C § 
2511(1)(a) (2006); see also id. § 2510(2) (2006) (defining “oral communication”). The oral communi-
cation aspects of the Wiretap Act, however, are not implicated by the issues raised in this Article. 
41 See OTA REPORT, supra note 35, at 36 (noting that while courts had yet to rule on the 
matter, Title III applied to all phone conversations, regardless of whether they were in digital or 
analog form).  
42 United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978).  
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computer transmissions did not contain sounds and therefore were not 
protected by statutory law.43  
Second, the Wiretap Act only applied to real-time interception instead 
of access to stored communications.44 This made sense with ephemeral 
telephone calls because the only way to access a phone call was to listen in 
real-time as the call occurred. However, electronic mail was stored at 
various places in the course of delivery, and accessing a stored communica-
tion was not an “interception” because it was not contemporaneous with the 
communication’s transmission.45 As a result, the Wiretap Act did not offer 
any protection against government access to stored email.46 Although the 
OTA Report noted that the Fourth Amendment might protect individuals 
against government access to their stored emails,47 the possible scope of 
Fourth Amendment protection was uncertain. Any protection might not 
apply to backup copies held by “electronic mail companies,”48 which the 
government could access. 
C.  The Enactment of ECPA and Its Major Amendments 
In 1986, just one year after the OTA Report, Congress enacted ECPA 
to provide privacy protections for new uses of computer technologies.49 
ECPA contains three parts. The first part expands the Wiretap Act so that 
its prohibition on interception extends to computer data  
transmissions in addition to telephone calls.50 Another part of the statute 
adds protections against the use of pen registers, which are tools used to 
monitor the numbers dialed from a person’s telephone.51 Sometimes known 
 
43 Id. at 157. 
44 At the time, the leading precedent on this point was United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 
(5th Cir. 1976). 
45 Id. at 658-59 (holding that Congress did not intend to protect against intrusions into an 
individual’s email communications under the Wiretap Act). 
46 See OTA REPORT, supra note 35, at 48-52 (analyzing the different stages of the electronic 
communications process and suggesting various policy options open to Congress in legislating 
government access to electronic mail). 
47 Id. at 49-50 (explaining that electronic communications which had been printed out and 
mailed “would receive the same protections that are accorded first class mail”). 
48 Id. at 50 (“[I]t is possible that an individual would not have a legal basis from which to 
challenge an electronic mail company’s disclosure of the contents of messages or records of 
messages sent.”). 
49 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(1986). 
50 This amendment was Title I of ECPA, and it amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006). 
51 This amendment was Title III of ECPA, and it was codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 
(2006). 
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as the Pen Register Statute, this portion of ECPA makes it unlawful to 
install a monitoring device to record telephone numbers unless the govern-
ment first obtains a court order or the phone company records the numbers 
for business purposes.52  
But the most complex part of the new statute, and the part that has be-
come by far the most important, is the section known as the Stored Com-
munications Act (SCA).53 The SCA creates statutory privacy rights for 
“subscribers or customers” of two kinds of Internet services.54 The first kind 
of Internet service protected by the statute is the one most relevant to 
individual users. The statute creates privacy protections in email services, 
referred to in the statute as “electronic communications service” (ECS) 
providers.55 The second kind of Internet service protected by the statute 
was (at least at the time) of primary interest to businesses. Businesses such 
as hospitals and banks often outsourced storage and processing services to 
commercial services.56 This was true because computer storage was very 
expensive, and business software such as spreadsheet programs had not been 
invented. Congress opted to create statutory privacy protections for the 
customers of these commercial services, referred to in the statute as provid-
ers of “remote computing services” (RCS).57 
The statute then creates two kinds of protections for customers of the 
two covered providers. First, it creates legal rules for when the government 
can compel providers to disclose records about customers and subscribers; 
second, it creates legal rules for when the providers can disclose records 
voluntarily.58 Significantly, the rules for both compelling and voluntarily 
disclosing records act as an on–off switch: where any category of records can 
be disclosed, all records held by the provider can be disclosed.59 To put the 
point in language from the Fourth Amendment context, the statute imposes 
no limits on particularity: there is no need to be specific as to which emails, 
 
52 Id. For a helpful discussion of the Pen Register Statute, see In re Order Authorizing In-
stallation of Pen Register, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1558-61 (M.D. Fla. 1994). 
53 The Stored Communications Act was enacted as Title II of ECPA, and it is codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (2006). 
54 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006). 
55 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006). 
56 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 10-11 (1986). 
57 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2) (2006). 
58 In the current version of the statute, the rules on compelled disclosure are found in 18 
U.S.C. § 2703, while the rules on voluntary disclosure are found in 18 U.S.C. § 2702.  
59 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (2006) (allowing a provider to “divulge a record or other infor-
mation pertaining to a subscriber”). 
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which files, or which records were obtained. Instead, disclosure of one 
record allows disclosure of all records.60  
Unlike the Wiretap Act of 1968, the SCA of 1986 is notable for impos-
ing no minimization requirement.61 Under the Wiretap Act, lawful access to 
communications comes with strings attached. Even after obtaining a lawful 
wiretap order, agents are required to screen communications ex ante.62 No 
such limitations were imposed under the SCA. Under the SCA, a court 
order requires the provider to provide the government with the entire 
contents of the account.63 The government is then free to look through all 
of it, with no limits on the government’s power to use communications it 
finds, whether relevant or not to the crime under investigation.64 
In any communications network, a fundamental distinction exists be-
tween the actual message to be sent over the network and information on 
the network that relates to the how, when, and where of the message. The 
former is the content of the communication; the latter are noncontent 
records known as metadata or envelope information.65 In the context of 
Internet communications, the contents include the actual messages in 
emails, together with their subject lines, as well as the contents of files 
stored on the network.66 In contrast, the metadata includes IP addresses, 
to– from information on emails, login times, and locations.67 As enacted in 
its original form, the SCA focused its attention on contents held by provid-
ers of ECS and RCS instead of noncontent information. Unopened emails 
stored for less than 180 days received the full protection of a warrant.68 
Opened emails and remotely stored files held by providers of RCS received 
less protection.69  But protections for noncontent information were the 
 
60 Id. 
61 See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1264, 1298 (2004) (arguing that the SCA along with the Pen Register Act fell short of requiring 
minimization procedures among other privacy protections). 
62 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (2006) (holding that agents may be required to give progress 
reports to a court). 
63 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006). 
64 Id. 
65 For postal letters, the difference is the letter versus the outside of the envelope. 
66 See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That 
Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 611-13 (2003) (discussing the distinction between content and 
envelope information across different technologies). 
67 Id. at 614. 
68 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (1988). 
69 Id. § 2703(b) (1988).  
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weakest protections in the statute and appear to be added almost as an 
afterthought.70 
Although the basic structure of the 1986 statute remains in place today, 
two subsequent amendments are worth noting. First, in 1994, Congress 
bolstered the privacy protections for some kinds of noncontent infor-
mation.71 Under the 1994 Amendment, the government must establish 
“specific and articulable facts” to obtain a court order requiring the disclo-
sure of many kinds of noncontent Internet records, such as the to–from 
addresses on emails.72 This amendment reflects the reasonable suspicion 
threshold familiar to students of Fourth Amendment law. 73  Congress 
codified the section that provides for this order at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), and 
as a result the court orders are known colloquially as “2703(d) orders.”74  
Second, as part of the Patriot Act in 2001, Congress amended the pen 
register provisions of ECPA to clarify that they apply to Internet commu-
nications as well as telephone calls.75 The 1986 text of the pen register 
provisions of ECPA was largely telephone-specific. 76  It prohibited the 
installation of devices to record telephone numbers dialed absent a court 
order.77 At the same time, the 1986 text left unclear whether the statute only 
provided privacy protections for numbers dialed in telephone calls or if the 
protections also applied to the real-time acquisition of noncontent records 
relating to Internet communications.78 The Patriot Act clarified that the pen 
register sections of ECPA apply to the Internet by redefining terms such as 
“pen register” to include all “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information” relating to any telecommunications network.79 As a result, the 
pen register provisions of ECPA now extend to government surveillance of 
 
70 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (1988) (highlighting lower requirements for government 
access to records like payment information, names, and addresses from remote computing 
services). 
71 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 
(1994). 
72 Id. 
73 See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that “the ‘specific 
and articulable facts’ standard [in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)] derives from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Terry”). 
74 See LAFAVE, supra note 2, at § 4.8(c) (“The court order found in § 2703(d) is often re-
ferred to as a ‘2703(d)’ order or simply a ‘d’ order.”). 
75 Kerr, Internetsupra note 66, at 639. 
76 Id. at 626. 
77 From 1986 to 2001, a “pen register” was defined by the statute as “a device which records 
or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmit-
ted on the telephone line to which such device is attached.” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1988). 
78 See Kerr, Internetsupra note 66, at 634 (noting that while the text was unclear, law en-
forcement practice consistently applied the sections to the Internet). 
79 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006). 
  
386 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 373 
 
noncontent addressing information, such as Internet Protocol addresses and 
the to–from information for email communications.80 
The ECPA that emerges from the original 1986 statute and its major 
amendments is premised on a series of dichotomies. Knowing how the 
statute regulates a particular kind of privacy-invading action requires 
classifying the action based on the statute’s distinctions. For example, is the 
surveillance occurring in real-time (prospectively), or does it involve access 
to stored records (retrospectively)? The Wiretap Act and Pen Register 
provisions of ECPA apply in the former case, while the Stored Communi-
cations Act provisions apply in the latter case. Does the conduct involve 
access to contents of communications, or does it involve access to noncon-
tent envelope information? The former are regulated by the Wiretap Act 
and parts of the Stored Communications Act, while the latter are regulated 
by the Pen Register provisions and different parts of the Stored Communi-
cations Act. Are the communications held by a remote computing service or 
electronic communications service? Is the disclosure voluntary or com-
pelled? Again, the answer points the reader to a different section of the 
statute, which involves different protections. 
D.  The Current Criticisms of ECPA—and Their Limits 
ECPA was an impressive achievement in its day. A quarter century lat-
er, however, it has become commonplace to recognize that ECPA is outdat-
ed.81 But although the need to update ECPA is widely recognized, existing 
criticisms of the statute and current reform proposals tend to tinker around 
the edges of the statute. The proposals retain the basic structure of the 
statute and only “update” a few sections within it.  
Perhaps the best way to appreciate the limited nature of existing criti-
cism is to examine the reform proposals recently advocated by a large and 
influential set of civil liberties groups, Internet companies, and privacy 
scholars known as the Digital Due Process Coalition.82 The group includes 
nonprofit organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, as well as major Internet businesses, 
including Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, and AT&T.83 
 
80 Id. 
81 Savage, supra note 4. 
82 The corporate members of the group include a virtual “who’s who” of the Internet world. 
Who We Are, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid= 
DF652CE0-2552-11DF-B455000C296BA163 (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
83 Id. 
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Understanding the Coalition’s four principles provides a helpful illustration 
of the limited ambitions of existing ECPA reform proposals.  
The first proposal of the Digital Due Process Coalition would impose a 
warrant requirement for compelled government access to stored contents of 
communications held by a provider of ECS or RCS.84 Some background 
may be helpful to understand this proposal. The SCA imposes a warrant 
requirement in some cases but not in others. On one hand, the government 
needs a warrant to compel the release of communications content held by a 
provider of ECS for up to 180 days.85 On the other hand, the government 
does not need a warrant to compel the release of contents held by a provider 
of ECS for more than 180 days or held by a provider of RCS.86  
Under this framework, the SCA offers less protection than a warrant to 
regulate government access to many remotely stored personal files. For 
example, old emails are no longer fully protected under the ECS rules.87 
Additionally, because individuals often use third party Internet storage 
services that count under the RCS rules—for example, Google Drive88 and 
other cloud storage services—many of their personal files are protected by 
less process than a warrant under the RCS rules as well. The first proposal 
of the Digital Due Process Coalition would replace that patchwork of 
protections with a simple warrant requirement for all contents held by a 
provider of RCS or ECS for any length of time. 
The second Coalition proposal would require a warrant whenever the 
government compels ECS or RCS providers to disclose location information 
 
84 The Coalition’s website explains this proposal in detail: 
A governmental entity may require an entity covered by ECPA (a provider of wire 
or electronic communication service or a provider of remote computing service) to 
disclose communications that are not readily accessible to the public only with a 
search warrant issued based on a showing of probable cause, regardless of the age of 
the communications, the means or status of their storage or the provider’s access to 
or use of the communications in its normal business operations. 
Our Principles, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION, 
http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=99629E40-2551-11DF-8E02000C296BA163 (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
85 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006). 
86 Id. § 2703(b). 
87 This may be true for two reasons. First, the email may be in electronic storage for more 
than 180 days, and thus may be covered under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b). Alternatively, some courts 
have held that opened email that is stored on a server is held in the provider’s capacity as a remote 
computing service, and thus becomes covered under § 2703(b) immediately after it is opened and 
the copy is stored. Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 2012). 
88 See generally About Google Drive, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/drive/about.html (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
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for mobile devices such as cellular phones.89 Mobile devices create location 
records because device providers need to know where the devices are 
located to route communications to and from them. Cellular phones did 
exist when ECPA was first drafted; however, the statute did not include any 
special rules to govern access to records relating to their use. Instead, the 
current statute treats mobile location information like other noncontent 
records. Under the SCA, retrospective government access to stored location 
information generally requires a 2703(d) order.90 However, because ECPA 
does not provide for prospective access to location information, 91  the 
government generally must obtain a warrant under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure to obtain ongoing access in “real-time” to such location 
information.92 The Coalition proposal would extend the statutory warrant 
requirement to retrospective collection of stored location information. 
The third Coalition proposal is to raise the statutory threshold for pen 
register information.93 Under the pen register provisions of ECPA, the 
government can obtain an order to collect noncontent addressing infor-
mation in real-time with a mere certification that the information to be 
collected is believed to be relevant to an ongoing investigation.94  No 
showing of reasonable suspicion or probable cause is required, and the judge 
 
89 See Our Principles, supra note 84. (“A governmental entity may access, or may require a 
covered entity to provide, prospectively or retrospectively, location information regarding a 
mobile communications device only with a warrant issued based on a showing of probable 
cause.”). 
90 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
91 The Pen Register statute might be thought to regulate prospective access to location in-
formation, but Congress indicated a contrary intent in a section of the Communications Assis-
tance to Law Enforcement Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2006) (“[W]ith regard to 
information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices 
(as defined in section 3127 of title 18), such call-identifying information shall not include any 
information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber.”).  
92 Lower courts are not uniform on this point, but it is the majority view and, in my view, 
the correct one. See generally In re Application of U.S. For & Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a 
Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info.; and 
(3) Authorizing Disclosure of Location-Based Servs., 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 577-78 (W.D. Tex. 
2010). 
93 According to the group’s proposal, 
A governmental entity may access, or may require a covered entity to provide, pro-
spectively or in real-timereal-timereal-time, dialed number information, email to and 
from information or other data currently covered by the authority for pen registers 
and trap and trace devices only after judicial review and a court finding that the gov-
ernmental entity has made a showing at least as strong as the showing under 2703(d). 
Our Principles, supra note 84. 
94 18 U.S.C. § 3122(2)(b)(2) (2006). 
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does not make an independent determination of the facts. The Coalition 
proposal would require that the government “at least” satisfies the reasona-
ble suspicion standard of a 2703(d) order prior to compelling pen register 
information.  
The final Coalition proposal would limit the government’s power to 
subpoena account information for multiple individuals or accounts.95 ECPA 
permits the government to compel a limited set of information about 
accounts with a mere subpoena, such as a subscriber’s name and address (if 
known), records of session times and durations, and IP addresses.96 The 
Coalition would maintain this power but clarify that multiple subpoenas are 
needed for multiple accounts unless the government establishes some sort 
of cause for multi-account orders.  
The four proposals of the Digital Due Process Coalition provide a help-
ful sense of the kinds of ECPA reform proposals that have been made in 
recent years, both in the academic scholarship and in Congressional bills. 
Nevertheless, it is striking how much the Coalition’s proposals accept the 
basic structure of the 1986 statute. They accept the existing coverage of the 
Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act, and Pen Register statute. They 
accept the existing distinction between real-time and stored access, the 
distinction between content and noncontent, and the existing definition of 
ECS and RCS. Three of the four proposals focus on a single narrow 
question: the thresholds of cause that the government must satisfy to 
compel information from a provider in various contexts.  
To be clear, I agree with some of the Coalition’s proposals.97 But wheth-
er one agrees or disagrees with them, the existing proposals work within 
ECPA’s outdated framework. The remainder of this Article takes a different 
approach. Instead of asking how existing laws might be amended, it imagi-
nes what Congress should do if it were to start from scratch. Internet 
technology and Fourth Amendment law is far from where they were in the 
 
95 See Our Principles, supra note 84 (“Where the Stored Communications Act authorizes a 
subpoena to acquire information, a governmental entity may use such subpoenas only for 
information related to a specified account(s) or individual(s). All non-particularized requests must 
be subject to judicial approval.”). 
96 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
97 For example, I advocated the Coalition’s third proposal in a 2003 article. See Kerr, Inter-
netsupra note 66, at 643 (“I agree with civil libertarian critics who believe that the pen register 
standard should be raised.”). I have also testified about the Digital Due Process Coalition 
principles before the House Judiciary Committee. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 33-42 (2010) (Statement of Orin S. Kerr) (highlighting some of 
the criticisms of the Coalition’s principles presented in this Article). 
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1980s, and those changes suggest that starting with a clean slate would bring 
Congress to enact a very different statute. The next Part shows why. 
II.  HOW CHANGING LAW AND TECHNOLOGY RENDER  
ECPA OUTDATED 
This Section explains how current technology and constitutional law 
have rendered the dichotomies of ECPA outdated. ECPA is premised on a 
series of dichotomies created by the original 1986 Act. Several of the 
dichotomies are explicit, including real-time access versus stored access, 
ECS versus RCS, and content versus noncontent. Others are implicit in the 
statute, such as the territorial scope of the statute and the particularity of 
court orders. ECPA’s distinctions made sense in a world in which few 
records were created, few records were stored, and therefore, few records 
could be obtained. The statutory structure presumes an absence of Fourth 
Amendment protection, and it also presumes a world of users and providers 
inside the United States.  
Today’s network is very different. We have entered a world of almost 
total storage, in which providers and many users can—and often do—store 
everything. The Internet has become truly global, with many prominent 
U.S.-based Internet services serving a predominantly foreign customer 
base. Additionally, Fourth Amendment protections are becoming estab-
lished in ways that may soon outpace statutory standards. The old catego-
ries no longer work, indicating a need for new categories that should form 
the basis of a next generation privacy act. This Part explains how the major 
distinctions of ECPA have become obsolete. It shines a light on the net-
work technology of the present, revealing some surprising ways that the 
existing ECPA statute has become badly outdated. 
A.  Real-time Versus Stored Access 
The first fundamental dichotomy in ECPA is the distinction between 
real-time surveillance and access to stored records. Real-time surveillance is 
covered by the Wiretap Act and Pen Register statute; access to stored 
records is covered by the SCA. The statutory distinction between prospec-
tive and retrospective surveillance emerged for largely historical reasons. 
The telephone network predated the Internet, and telephone surveillance 
was necessarily real time. Additionally, the Supreme Court in Berger v. New 
York indicated that real-time wiretapping raised special privacy concerns: 
“continuous surveillance” raised the prospect that the government would 
need to monitor a great deal of unrelated private communications over time 
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in order to find the small subset of communications related to criminal 
activity.98 In contrast, access to stored communications raised much less of a 
concern, as relatively few communications were retained and therefore 
stored. As a result, real-time wiretapping required more privacy protections 
than stored access. 
That distinction made sense when Congress enacted ECPA. In the 
1980s, remote computer storage was very expensive.99 Internet services of 
that time were designed to limit storage. After a user read his email from a 
server, for example, the email typically was downloaded to the user’s 
computer and deleted from the server to save space.100 Back when remote 
storage was expensive, the difference between real time and stored access 
was important. Few sent communications were saved: Real time access 
raised special concerns that stored access did not. For that reason, Congress 
created special restrictions such as minimization on real-time data collec-
tion.101 The government had to carefully limit what information it accessed 
and then limit what it disclosed. No similar protections were written into 
the SCA.102 
Today, however, the distinction between stored and real-time surveil-
lance has blurred. Storage has become extremely cheap. Computer storage 
costs have dropped by a factor of ten roughly every four years for the last 
thirty years.103 The cost of storing a single gigabyte of data has dropped 
from about eighty-five thousand dollars in 1984 to about five cents in 
2011.104 As the cost of storage drops, Internet services offer the capacity to 
store everything cheaply. Storage has become the norm. And as storage has 
become cheap, the norm among users has changed along with it. Users no 
longer need to be careful about what they keep on the server. The server 
can keep everything.  
 
98  388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967). 
99 See R.J.T. Morris & B.J. Truskowsi, The Evolution of Storage Systems, 42 IBM SYS. J. 205, 
205-06 (2003) (examining the evolution of data storage systems and their costs). 
100 See OTA REPORT, supra note 35, at 47 (noting that emails sent over teletext could be 
saved or deleted by the receiving terminal after they had been viewed).  
101 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006) (extending the minimization requirements of the Wire-
tap Act from telephone to data transmissions). 
102 Solove, supra note 61, at 1298. 
103  John Villasenor, Recording Everything: Digital Storage as an Enabler of Authoritarian Gov-
ernments, BROOKINGS INST. 3 (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/research/files/papers/2011/12/14%20digital%20storage%20villasenor/1214_digital_storage_ 
villasenor.pdf. 
104 Id.; see also Morris & Truskowsi, supra note 99, at 206 (noting that since 1997 raw storage 
prices have been declining at 50-60% per year). 
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To appreciate the difference, consider the storage space available to us-
ers of free web-based email services. When free email services became 
popular in the mid to late 1990s, they generally came with about 2 mega-
bytes of storage space.105 In contrast, today’s popular free Gmail service 
comes with fifteen gigabytes (GB) of storage space, about seventy-five 
hundred times more storage than was common a decade ago.106 And it is 
taken for granted that the space that comes with free email services will 
only continue to increase.107  
Many readers will appreciate how the difference has changed their ap-
proach to email storage. A decade ago, it was commonplace for users to 
delete many stored communications to save space. Today the norm has 
flipped. The commonplace reaction is to store everything and simply search 
through data later to find what the user needs. The statistics bear this out. 
According to one recent report, a typical Gmail user stores more than 
seventeen thousand emails in her account at any given time.108 Almost 
twelve thousand of those emails are received and stored in the inbox; almost 
six thousand are sent emails directed elsewhere.109  
The drop in storage costs has led to a shift in the practices of Internet 
providers. Today’s Internet providers can—and often do—store everything. 
The Boston Police Department revealed a fascinating example in 2009 
when it released documents investigators had collected pursuant to ECPA 
to solve the case of the so-called “Craigslist Killer,” Philip Markoff.110 
Among the documents was a report the police had obtained from Facebook 
containing the stored contents of Markoff’s Facebook account. The 72-page 
 
105 See Paul Festa, Google to Offer Gigabyte of Free Email, CNET NEWS (Apr. 1, 2004), 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1032-5182805.html (highlighting how Gmail’s jump to one gigabyte of 
storage dwarfed previous storage limits of email providers). 
106 Nathan Ingraham, Google Unifies Gmail, Drive, and Photo Storage: All Users Now Get 15GB 
of Shared Space, VERGE (May 13, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/ 
2013/5/13/4326994/google-unifies-gmail-photo-and-drive-storage.  
107 Indeed, the amount of space provided to Gmail users rose from 10GB to 15GB in between 
drafts of this Article. See Chris Ziegler, Gmail Bumps Free Storage to 10GB, VERGE (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://www.theverge.com/2012/4/24/2971885/gmail-bumps-free-storage-to-10gb (reporting on the 
increase to 10GB and predicting that, “as always,” the amount of free storage will continue to 
“creep up over time”).  
108  Mike Barton, How Much Is Your Gmail Account Worth?, WIRED ( July 25, 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/insights/2012/07/gmail-account-worth. 
109 Id. 
110 See Carly Carioli, When the Cops Subpoena Your Facebook Information, Here’s What Facebook 
Sends the Cops, PHOENIX (Apr. 6, 2012), http://blog.thephoenix.com/ 
blogs/phlog/archive/2012/04/06/when-police-subpoena-your-facebook-information-heres-what-
facebook-sends-cops.aspx (noting, among other things, how Facebook reveals little of its 
involvement in subpoenas from investigators or how many the site serves). 
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report contained more than just the messages, friends lists, and pictures that 
we might think of as the contents of a Facebook account.111 It also contained 
every comment Markoff had posted and all of the deleted pictures and 
deleted friends he once had but then tried to erase. More remarkably, it also 
contained records of every single click that Markoff had made while using 
Facebook. Every visit to every page, every viewing of every picture, and 
every click on every link was documented with a specific entry in a log 
file.112 Facebook had recorded it all.  
As these examples suggest, the drop in the price of storage has caused an 
unappreciated sea change in the practical implication of access to stored 
communications. The default has switched from store-only-important-
records to store-it-all. Granted, Facebook does not store everything only 
because it is cheap. Facebook’s business model depends on being able to sell 
targeted advertisements based on what users do, which requires close 
monitoring of what they do.113 But the low cost of storage makes that 
possible.  
The change has enormous implications for Internet surveillance law. 
When everything is stored, stored access begins to reveal the same level of 
detail as real-time access. The difference between real-time surveillance and 
stored access evaporates. If anything, stored access is even more revealing 
and invasive. Real-time surveillance is cabined by time. For example, thirty 
days of real-time surveillance can only reveal communications over the 
thirty-day period. In contrast, one time access to stored contents can reveal 
the complete details of communications over a period of years. The ability to 
store everything makes storage the greater privacy threat. Real-time 
surveillance becomes only a slice of the world that access to stored contents 
can produce.  
The surprising rarity of investigative real-time wiretapping for Internet 
communications helps confirm the point. Federal law requires the Adminis-
trative Office of the U.S. Courts to publish an annual wiretapping report 
that discloses the number and type of wiretapping orders obtained pursuant 
to state and federal wiretap statutes.114 In 2012, a total of 633 federal wiretap 
 
111  See Subpoena: Philip Markoff’s Facebook Account, SCRIBD, http://www.scribd.com/ 
fullscreen/88465177?access_key=key-247mvzrfrh1m1azdsoai (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
112 Carioli, supra note 110. 
113 See Samantha Felix, This Is How Facebook Is Tracking Your Internet Activity, BUS. INSIDER 
(Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/this-is-how-facebook-is-tracking-your-Internet-
activity-2012-9?op=1 (noting how Facebook uses cookies to both track users and store their 
information). 
114 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Report of the Director of the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the 
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orders were obtained.115 But here’s a puzzle: astonishingly few wiretap 
orders were obtained for Internet communications. The total number of 
federal wiretaps obtained to intercept “electronic communications”—a 
category that includes computer communications, pagers, and fax ma-
chines—was three.116 That’s not a typo. In the entire United States, federal 
investigators obtained only three Title III orders to obtain Internet com-
munications.117 
This does not mean that investigators took a holiday from collecting 
evidence over the Internet. Instead, investigators have focused their 
attention on collecting stored records. Recent Google Transparency Reports 
provide some useful data. In the last six months of 2012, state and federal 
investigators in the United States obtained 1896 search warrants for ac-
counts operated by Google (most of which were for the contents of Gmail 
accounts).118 In light of current trends, this would mean that Google likely 
received about 4000 warrants for the contents of accounts in the year 2012. 
And of course Google is only one provider among many. Only a small 
percentage of email accounts in the United States are hosted by Google.  
To be sure, the changing costs of storage are not the only explanation for 
this shift in practices. The increased use of encryption has made real-time–
Internet wiretapping much more difficult than it was previously. Because 
services tend to store the contents of communications in plaintext even if 
they send communications in ciphertext, the government naturally will try to 
collect the communications when they are stored rather than in transit.119 In 
addition, the investigative focus on stored communications partially reflects 
the lower statutory threshold for access to stored communications. A 
 
Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communication, ( 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
Statistics/WiretapReports/wiretap-report-2012.aspx (providing the annual report online). 
115 Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts on Applications for 
Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communication, ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, at tbl.6 ( June 2013), http://www.uscourts. 
gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2012/Table6.pdf. 
116 Id.  
117 Another federal order was obtained that included some combination of telephone surveil-
lance, Internet surveillance, and physical bugging, although the report does not disclose how many 
of those included Internet surveillance. Id. 
118 Transparency Report: United States, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/ 
userdatarequests/US (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
119 See Peter Swire, From Real-Time Intercepts to Stored Records: Why Encryption Drives the 
Government to Seek Access to the Cloud 7 (Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies at the 
Moritz College of Law, Working Paper No. 175, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
id=2038871 (noting that logistical and technical issues are driving the emphasis on stored 
communication). 
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standard search warrant is sufficient to compel a provider to disclose stored 
contents, while real-time surveillance requires a Title III “super warrant” 
that is substantially harder to obtain.120 But the difference also reflects the 
reality that stored access is a more than adequate substitute in most investi-
gations. The low cost of storage ensures that stored access generally produc-
es the same level of detail as real-time surveillance. As a result, 
technological change has reversed the assumptions of the 1986 statute.  
B.  ECS Versus RCS and the Limited Coverage of the SCA 
The second fundamental dichotomy in ECPA is the distinction between 
providers of electronic communication service and remote computing 
service. In 1986, this reflected the two primary ways that users stored files 
on computer networks.121 The ECS protections covered email; the RCS 
protections covered contents of communications transmitted for remote 
storage and processing by services available to the public. The SCA does 
not protect any other kinds of contents because they fall out of the two 
kinds of network services that were common in 1986.122 
This approach is obsolete today for two reasons. First, it likely leaves 
unprotected perhaps the most private kinds of communications sent by 
modern Internet users: search requests. Search engines did not exist in 1986 
because there was no web to search; the World Wide Web had not yet been 
invented.123 Today, however, we send our most private thoughts to Google 
and other search engines to explore our questions, hopes, fears, and dreams. 
According to one study, search engines analyzed about 18.4 billion search 
requests from the United States in March of 2012 alone.124 That is about 
two searches a day per person in the United States, or more than 650 
searches per year. Search engines store all of those requests, often for 
 
120 See id. (indicating the trend of increasing numbers over time). 
121 See supra Section I.B. 
122 See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214 (2004) (outlining areas of coverage limitation for 
the SCA). 
123 Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web in 1990, and the first browser was in-
troduced in 1994. See TIM BERNERS-LEE & MARK FISCHETTI, WEAVING THE WEB: THE 
ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB 69 (1999); see also 
NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO GOOGLE 17 
(2008) (describing the introduction of the mosaic browser and the intention of gearing toward 
maximizing the number of users). 
124  See, e.g., ComScore Releases March 2012 U.S. Search Engine Rankings, COMSCORE (Apr. 11, 
2012), http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2012/4/comScore_Releases_March_ 
2012_U.S._Search_Engine_Rankings (displaying the total searches in February and March of 
2012). 
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months or even years. For example, Google presently stores search queries 
for 18 months, and previously stored them for 24 months.125  
ECPA likely offers no protection for access to stored search queries, 
however, because it does not fit the 1986 dichotomies codified by the 
statute. Search engines plainly do not provide ECS as they are destinations 
for communications, not providers of connectivity or messaging.126 And 
search queries do not appear to be protected under the RCS rules either. A 
remote computing service is defined as a service that provides the public 
“computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic commu-
nications system.”127 Users do not send their search queries to Google in 
order for the site to store them. Storage is a bug for users, not a feature.  
The question of whether ECPA protects search queries therefore hinges 
on whether search engines “process” data that users send them. The rele-
vant text and legislative history suggests that they do not. In the context of 
computer data, the word “process” suggests performing operations on that 
data rather than responding to a query. The legislative history makes the 
context clear: remote processing meant the outsourcing of tasks, such as 
number-crunching, that a computer of the 1980s might not be able to 
complete easily.128 Search engines do not seem to fit that mold. Individuals 
do not use search engines as substitutes for the storage or processing powers 
of their own machines. Although the issue is difficult and not free from 
 
125 Thomas Crampton, Google to Cut Back on How Long It Keeps Search History, N.Y. TIMES 
( June 12, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-google.4. 
6113031.html?_r=0. 
126 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006) defines an ECS as “any service which provides to users 
thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” This limits ECS 
providers to providers of connectivity or messaging of covered wire or electronic communications. 
127 Id. § 2711(2). 
128 The Senate Report accompanying the passage of ECPA offered the following explanation 
of the concept of a “remote computing service”:  
In the age of rapid computerization, a basic choice has faced the users of computer 
technology. That is, whether to process data in-house on the user’s own computer or 
on someone else’s equipment. Over the years, remote computer service companies 
have developed to provide sophisticated and convenient computing services to sub-
scribers and customers from remote facilities. Today businesses of all sizes—
hospitals, banks and many others—use remote computing services for computer pro-
cessing. This processing can be done with the customer or subscriber using the facili-
ties of the remote computing service in essentially a time-sharing arrangement, or it 
can be accomplished by the service provider on the basis of information supplied by 
the subscriber or customer. 
S. REP. NO. 99-541, 10-11 (1986). 
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doubt,129 it appears likely that the most private of today’s communications 
receive no statutory protection from ECPA.  
A second problem with the ECS–RCS dichotomy is that today’s Inter-
net services are routinely multifunctional. In 1986, users accessed the 
Internet by connecting to mainframe computers that gave users access to 
the network and an email account.130 In the language of ECPA, they were 
ECS providers that gave users access to services that included RCS provid-
ers. Today, however, users connect to the Internet in many different ways, 
including broadband and wireless accounts. Network access is always 
present, running in the background rather than acting as a conscious user 
destination.131 At the same time, content messaging such as email or text 
messaging is simply one service available among many bundled together. 
Take the example of Facebook.132 Facebook is not just an email service. 
Rather, Facebook offers an amalgam of many different kinds of services, 
including email, chat, photograph hosting, search functions, and bulletin 
board services.  
The multifunctional nature of modern Internet services creates head-
aches for ECPA by raising complex and perhaps unanswerable questions 
about what the statute protects. ECPA’s privacy protections hinge on the 
status of the provider. Given that providers wear multiple hats, multiple 
privacy protections may apply to records. Imagine that a provider acts as an 
ECS for one set of communications, an RCS for another, and neither an 
ECS nor an RCS for a third. What privacy protections should apply when 
the government seeks the disclosure of records under the statute? If the 
government is seeking noncontent records, the current statute offers 
 
129 At least one major search engine, Google, claims to be covered by the SCA on the ground 
that it provides RCS. In litigation over the disclosure of Google search queries, Google argued 
that its services are protected by the SCA:  
Google processes search requests as directed by, and for, its users who in turn re-
trieve the search results of their choosing from Google's index, or Google sends the 
results by email or text messages to individuals, to wireless phones or other desig-
nated mobile devices. Said in plain language, users rely on the remote computer fa-
cilities of Google to process and store their search requests and to retrieve by elec-
electronic transmission their search results. 
Google’s Opp’n to the Gov’t's Motion to Compel at 12, Gonzales v. Google, 234 F.R.D. 674 
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 06-80006), 2006 WL 543697, at *12 (citation omitted).  
130 It was also during this time that personal computers began to make gains on the main-
frame-computing model. See CARR, supra note 1233, at 54-55 (describing the increased acceptance 
of the personal computer as a business tool). 
131 See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1314 
(2012) (describing the “always on” nature of modern communications devices).  
132 See FACEBOOK, http://facebook.com. As if any cite were necessary.  
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conflicting answers depending on what service are provided for those sets of 
records.133 The old dichotomies don’t fit today’s technological practices.  
C.  Content Versus Noncontent Metadata 
The next dichotomy in ECPA is the distinction between the contents of 
communications and noncontent metadata. When ECPA was first enacted, 
the statute focused on providing statutory protections for contents. The 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection for such contents was unclear.134 
Statutory protections guaranteed privacy if the Fourth Amendment protec-
tions did not materialize or at least until they did so. In contrast, ECPA’s 
protections for noncontent information were an afterthought.135 Although 
later amendments paid more attention to privacy concerns in noncontent 
records, the statute maintains its focus on protecting contents.  
Such a focus may no longer make sense for two complementary reasons. 
First, changing technology has rendered metadata analysis more important. 
The capacity of computers to efficiently analyze metadata has made metada-
ta surveillance more significant than it was in the past. The line between 
contents and metadata remains fundamental,136 but metadata analysis has 
become a more powerful tool than before. Metadata analysis has also 
 
133 For example, imagine a company employee logs into the company server to write an 
email and view a stored document. The government wants records from the company about the 
employee’s conduct. If the government is seeking those records from the company in its capacity 
as an email provider—that is, as a provider of ECS—then it needs a 2703(d) order to compel the 
noncontent records. But if the government is seeking those same records from the company in its 
capacity as a private company that has log-in records about accessing the stored file, then ECPA 
does not apply at all: The provider is not an ECS because it is not providing email service with 
respect to that file and cannot be a provider of RCS because its services are not available to the 
public. Whether the statute applies depends on the metaphysical question of whether you see the 
records as relating to the email or the stored file.  
134 See OTA REPORT, supra note 35, at 3 (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s protections 
have not kept pace with technological advances). The only significant decision applying the 
Fourth Amendment to computer networks before the late 1990s was United States v. Horowitz, 806 
F.2d 1222 (4th Cir. 1986), which was handed down a few months after ECPA’s adoption. Further, 
Horowitz was more interesting for the issues it raised than the issues it answered. The defendant 
had sent information electronically to a customer, and the government recovered the information 
from the customer’s server. Id. at 1224. The Fourth Circuit had no problem concluding that the 
defendant did not have Fourth Amendment rights in the data he had sent to the customer and 
that was available on the customer’s computer. See id. at 1225-26.  
135 See supra Part I.C. 
136 See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1019-22, 1034-35 (2010) (“To apply the Fourth Amendment to the Internet in 
a technologically neutral way, access to the contents of communications should be treated like 
access to evidence located inside. . . . [and] access to noncontent information should be treated 
like access to evidence found outside.”). 
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become comparatively important with the rise of encryption.137 Internet 
services that generate metadata possess it in unencrypted form. Encryption 
that might complicate or entirely thwart content surveillance may still leave 
metadata available for government analysis.138  
Second, changing law may render the content protections of ECPA 
much less important. In the last few years, several lower courts have ruled 
that the Fourth Amendment fully protects the contents of emails held by 
third party providers. The leading case is United States v. Warshak, a Sixth 
Circuit decision by Judge Boggs involving government access to emails held 
by the defendant’s Internet service provider.139 Investigators relied on a 
provision of the SCA to subpoena the defendant’s Internet service provider 
for the contents of stored emails relating to a massive fraud scheme.140 The 
provider complied and gave investigators copies of thousands of email 
messages without a warrant. The Sixth Circuit held that obtaining the 
contents of emails without a warrant was unconstitutional: users have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their emails just like their letters and 
phone calls.141 As a result, the provision of the SCA permitting the govern-
ment to obtain emails with less process than a warrant was unconstitution-
al.142 
Several courts have agreed with the Sixth Circuit since Warshak, includ-
ing federal courts in Kansas143 and the District of Columbia,144 and the state 
of Washington Court of Appeals.145 Other courts have applied Warshak to 
 
137 See generally Swire, supra note 119 (connecting technology changes to changes in surveil-
lance practices). 
138 I use the term “may” because the details depend on complex questions of what is defined 
as contents and what is defined as metadata. See Kerr, Internetsupra note 66, at 646 n.190 
(describing the confusion surrounding whether certain metadata constitutes “content” or 
“addressing information” for Fourth Amendment purposes).  
139 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
140 Id. at 281-83. 
141 Id. at 285-86. 
142 Id. at 288 (“[T]o the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain 
such emails warrantlessly, [that portion of] the SCA is unconstitutional.”). 
143 In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Address, 
2012 WL 4383917, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012) (“The Court finds the rationale set forth in 
Warshak persuasive and therefore holds that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in emails or faxes stored with, sent to, or received through an electronic communications service 
provider.”). 
144 United States v. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 39 n.39 (D.D.C. 2012) (recognizing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the content of emails). 
145 See State v. Hinton, 280 P.3d 476, 483 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (“While Warshak does not 
aid Hinton, its comparison of emails with traditional forms of communication is helpful and we 
adopt it to hold that text messages deserve privacy protection similar to that provided for 
letters.”). 
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find a reasonable expectation of privacy in stored Facebook messages,146 text 
messages,147 faxes,148 and password-protected websites.149 Moreover, multi-
ple courts have presumed Fourth Amendment protection in emails. In 
evaluating the lawfulness of warrants obtained to collect emails pursuant to 
Section 2703(a) of ECPA, those courts have mostly not even paused to 
consider whether the communications might be unprotected.150 In contrast, 
no court has reached the contrary result. Warshak has been adopted by every 
court that has squarely decided the question. The case law is not entirely 
settled, as only one federal court of appeals has squarely addressed the issue. 
But the trend in the case law is to recognize fairly broad Fourth Amend-
ment protection, backed by a warrant requirement, for stored contents such 
as emails.  
The existence of full constitutional protection for the contents of re-
motely stored Internet communications significantly lessens the need for 
statutory protections that were at the heart of the 1986 statute. In a histori-
cal sense, ECPA has served its purpose: Congress intended it as a stopgap 
measure designed to impose statutory protections until Fourth Amendment 
precedents became established. Now that the courts have stepped in and 
begun to regulate government access to stored contents, ECPA’s role can 
change. Statutory protections are still needed to regulate nongovernmental 
access to contents of communications that the Fourth Amendment will not 
reach.151 But recent Fourth Amendment rulings suggest that the focus of the 
statute can turn more to noncontent information, such as logs and IP 
addresses that remain outside the Fourth Amendment.152  
Granted, the constitutional protections remain tentative and the Su-
preme Court has not yet spoken. There is significant value in statutory 
 
146 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1142 (D. 
Minn. 2012) (“The Court agrees that one cannot distinguish a password-protected private 
Facebook message from other forms of private electronic correspondence.”). 
147 See Hinton, 280 P.3d at 483.email 
148 In re Applications for Search Warrants, 2012 WL 4383917, at *5. 
149 United States v. D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121-22 (D. Mass. 2007). 
150 See, e.g., United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); United 
States v. Cioffi, 668 F.Supp.2d 385, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. McDarrah, 2006 WL 
1997638, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006), aff’d, 351 F. App’x 558 (2d Cir. 2009). But see In re 
Applications for Search Warrants, 2012 WL 4383917, at *3-5 (discussing the Fourth Amendment 
question). 
151 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (noting that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not regulate private searches). 
152 See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510-11 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that noncon-
tent information such as IP addresses and the to–from information of email addresses is not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
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protections before the constitutional precedents are clearly established.153 At 
the same time, another constitutional development handed down after 
ECPA renders its content protections a mixed bag. In Illinois v. Krull, the 
Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the 
police conduct a search in reasonable reliance on statutory authority.154 An 
Illinois state statute allowed the police to conduct warrantless inspections of 
automobile salvage yard records.155 After the Illinois Supreme Court ruled 
the searches pursuant to the statute unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the exclusionary rule nonetheless did not apply because the 
officers had reasonably relied on the statute authorizing warrantless search-
es.156  
Under Krull, statutory privacy regulations such as ECPA’s protections 
for contents of communications cut both ways. Because ECPA’s provisions 
do not include a statutory exclusionary rule for either access to stored 
communications or the interception of computer communications, criminal 
defendants seeking suppression of evidence must rely on the Fourth 
Amendment. But Krull complicates efforts to clarify Fourth Amendment 
law through suppression motions by allowing courts to deny motions to 
suppress under the good-faith exception without resolving how the Fourth 
Amendment applies. That largely explains why the Warshak Court is the 
only federal circuit court to date that has directly addressed Fourth 
Amendment protections in email. Litigation over Fourth Amendment 
rights in email rarely reach the merits in light of Krull.157 Eliminating 
content protections under ECPA may paradoxically speed up the process of 
establishing the apparent strong constitutional protections.  
  
D.  Particularity and Minimization of Internet Communications and Records 
The fourth outdated feature of ECPA is the absence of any reference to 
particularity or minimization of records obtained beyond the Wiretap Act. 
 
153 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805, 857-87 (2004) (discussing the 
“institutional limitations of judicial rulemaking” and the “significant institutional advantage” of 
legislatures with respect to the regulation of “criminal investigations involving new technologies”). 
154 480 U.S. 340, 342 (1987). 
155 Id. at 343. 
156 Id. at 355-57. 
157 I discussed how the Krull good-faith exception has delayed the case law on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of government access to email in Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment 
Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United 
States, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 257 (2011).  
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Particularity is a concept from Fourth Amendment law that refers to the 
scope of searches and seizures. 158  The Fourth Amendment states that 
warrants must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”159 By limiting the scope of searches, the 
particularity requirement helps avoid fishing expeditions. For example, it 
ensures that searches are directed at a single house rather than a city block 
(or entire city), and that they aim to collect specific evidence instead of any 
evidence.  
Applying the particularity concept to records collected from Internet 
providers prompts a difficult question: After the government satisfies the 
relevant threshold to obtain records, how many records may the govern-
ment then collect? This question did not arise when ECPA was drafted 
because few records existed to be accessed. At that time, storage was 
expensive and detailed records were rare. Companies generally deleted 
copies of emails read by users to save space for other messages.160 As a 
result, Congress never considered how the particularity standard applied to 
records collected from Internet providers. Investigators could not collect 
enough records to make particularity an issue, so the statute does not limit 
the particularity of orders to obtain information.  
The absence of any reference to the particularity of court orders creates 
considerable headaches today. Storage has become cheap, and Internet 
providers store vast amounts of information by default. As a result, the 
scope of records which may be obtained has become vitally important. 
Recall the example of the court order to obtain the contents of a single 
Facebook account.161 The 72-page report, which the Boston Police Depart-
ment had collected pursuant to ECPA to solve the case of the so-called 
“Craigslist Killer,” reflected every single message, photo, and mouse click 
ever associated with the account.162 A single court order disclosed every-
thing to the police as a matter of routine practice without any concern about 
the particularity of communications sought. 
ECPA is also silent on court orders that seek records regarding hun-
dreds or even thousands of users. A surveillance practice known colloquially 
 
158 See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1987) (stating that the particularity 
requirement allows only warrants that offer particular and specific descriptions of places that are to 
be searched). 
159 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. 
160 See generally supra Section I.B. 
161 See supra notes 42-44. 
162 The report is available at http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/88465177?access_key=key-
247mvzrfrh1m1azdsoai. 
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as a “cell tower dump” illustrates the problem.163 Cell phones must maintain 
contact with local cellular towers to route communications between the 
phones and the phone network.164 As a result, cell phone companies gener-
ate records showing which phones are in communication with particular 
towers at specific times.165 This so-called “cell-site” data provides a rough 
indication of the location of the phone, and thus presumably the location of 
its owner. A “cell tower dump” refers to the practice of obtaining records of 
all customers whose phones were in contact with a cell tower or group of 
towers over a particular period of time when a crime occurred.166 For 
example, if a bank robbery occurred on Main Street at 3 PM, a cell tower 
dump might allow the government to obtain records of every cell phone 
user whose phone was in contact with towers near Main Street at that time.  
In its current form, ECPA says nothing about the particularity of cell 
tower dumps. The statutory text merely states that, on a proper showing of 
cause, the government may obtain an order “requir[ing] a provider of 
electronic communication service . . .  to disclose . . . information pertain-
ing to a subscriber to or customer of such service.”167 If the phrase “a 
subscriber to or customer of” means that each order must be limited to a 
single customer, then ECPA does not allow cell tower dumps at all. But if 
ECPA allows court orders for multiple customers—as courts so far have 
assumed—then the statute is remarkably tone deaf to the scale of the 
privacy invasion.  
To see why, imagine a case where the police believe a house was robbed 
between noon and 6 PM on a busy city block. Does ECPA allow the police 
to obtain records for the entire six-hour window, potentially implicating 
thousands of users? And how many towers can the records concern? And 
what may the government do with all the data that it obtains, very little of 
which is likely to be relevant to the investigation?168 
Constitutional doctrine can address the particularity problem in ECPA 
within the narrow context of contents already protected by Fourth 
Amendment. In one recent case, a magistrate judge refused to issue a search 
warrant sought under ECPA for the contents of an email account and a fax 
 
163 See, e.g., In re U.S. ex rel. Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), Nos. 12-670, 12-671, 12-
672, 12-673, 2012 WL 4717778, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2012) (noting how the lack of government 
protocol on collecting information from cell tower dumps raises privacy issues). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2006). 
168 See In re U.S. ex rel. Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 2012 WL 4717778, at *4. 
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account because the requested warrants were insufficiently particular.169 The 
warrant applications asked for “all records and other information regarding 
the account”170 including “deleted communications, as well as all records and 
information regarding identification of the email or fax account, and other 
information stored by the account user, including address books, contact 
lists, calendar data, pictures and files.”171  
The Magistrate Judge held that such a request for information was “too 
broad and too general”172 to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. A warrant for 
the entire contents of the account was akin “to a warrant asking the post 
office to provide copies of all mail ever sent by or delivered to a certain 
address so that the government can open and read all the mail to find out 
whether it constitutes fruits, evidence or instrumentality of a crime.” 173 
Because the Fourth Amendment would not permit such a warrant for the 
post office, it would not “permit a similarly overly broad warrant just 
because the information sought is electronic communications versus paper 
ones.”174 
Although the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement can address 
the scope of searches for contents, it cannot serve the same role for noncon-
tent information that is outside the scope of constitutional protection.175 
The existing ECPA statute simply fails to address the allowed scope of 
records that can be sought under the statute.  
E.  The Territoriality of ECPA 
The final outdated aspect of ECPA is its territorial scope. In 1986, when 
the statute was drafted, communication over computer networks occurred 
mostly in the United States. Commercial providers such as CompuServe 
provided U.S. users with email and bulletin board services reachable by 
telephone and modem with U.S. numbers, but international calling rates 
made such services all but inaccessible outside the United States.176 The 
 
169 In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Address, 
2012 WL 4383917, at *10-11 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012). 
170 Id. at *8. 
171 Id. at *9. 
172 Id. at *8. 
173 Id. at *9. 
174 Id. 
175 See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510-11 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect noncontent information such as IP addresses and the to–
from information of email addresses). 
176 The cost of an international telephone call in the 1980s was measured in dollars per mi-
nute, making such access out of reach to most users. 
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U.S. government had established ARPANET, which eventually morphed 
into the Internet,177 but its use was heavily oriented toward users located in 
the United States.178 As a result, issues regarding the territorial scope of the 
statute did not arise in early debates over ECPA. Congress was instead 
focused on the rights of U.S. computer users and U.S. services.  
Even today, surprisingly few court decisions have addressed the current 
territorial scope of ECPA. Most of the relevant precedents involve the 
scope of the Wiretap Act. Courts have held that the telephone wiretapping 
provisions of the Wiretap Act only apply to interceptions inside the United 
States.179 Courts have justified this territorial limit on two grounds. The 
first ground is “the canon of construction which teaches that, unless a 
contrary intent appears, federal statutes apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.”180 The second ground is that the Wiretap 
Act provides only for U.S. courts issuing wiretap orders in their jurisdic-
tions, which suggests that Congress intended to limit the territorial scope of 
the Act to the United States.181 As a result, the Wiretap Act does not 
regulate any interceptions occurring outside U.S. borders.  
The sole precedent on the territorial scope of the Stored Communica-
tions Act provisions of ECPA is a single unpublished district court decision, 
Zheng v. Yahoo! Inc.182 In that case, political activists in China claimed that 
the Chinese government had tortured and detained them after Yahoo!’s 
Chinese affiliate “Yahoo! China” had disclosed identifying information 
about them to the Chinese government. 183  The district court rejected 
plaintiffs’ claim that the disclosure violated ECPA on the ground that 
ECPA does not apply to disclosures outside the United States.184 In reaching 
 
177 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997). 
178 By the time Reno went to trial, sixty percent of Internet servers were located in the Unit-
ed States. Id. at 850. 
179 See United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the Wire-
tap Act “has no extraterritorial force”); U.S. v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 279-80 (2d Cir. 1974) 
( f inding that the “federal statute governing wiretapping and eavesdropping has no application 
outside the United States” (citation omitted)). 
180 United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1975). 
181 Id. As noted by the district court in United States v. Angulo-Hurtado,  
Congress intended Title III to protect the integrity of United States communica-
tions systems against unauthorized interceptions taking place in the United States. If 
Congress had meant to require law enforcement agencies to satisfy Title III for in-
terceptions conducted outside the United States, it would have provided some 
mechanism by which agents could obtain such approval. Congress did not do so. 
165 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001). 
182 No. 08-1068, 2009 WL 4430297 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2009). 
183 Id. at *1.  
184 Id. at *4. 
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its decision, the court relied heavily on the reasoning of the cases interpret-
ing the territoriality of the Wiretap Act.185 It also noted that the enactment 
of ECPA did not contain any provisions rejecting that traditional territorial 
scope.186 
Although the territorial scope of ECPA was not the focus of attention 
when the statute was passed, it has since become tremendously important. 
Today’s Internet is truly global. A computer user can access a website across 
the world as easily as one across the street. Servers can be located anywhere, 
even thousands of miles away from company headquarters. For example, 
the servers hosting the most popular Internet poker sites serving players all 
around the world are located in a nondescript building on an Indian reserva-
tion not far from Montreal, Canada.187 Or at least that is the case today, as 
the location could change at any time. 
The reality of global access means that U.S.-based Internet services of-
ten have a heavily foreign customer base. Consider Gmail, the popular 
email service provided by Google. Google is headquartered in California, 
but only 30 percent of Gmail’s users reside in the United States.188 This 
chart shows the percentage of Gmail’s users that are in a handful of differ-
ent countries as of September 2013189: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
185 Id. at *2 (citing United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987); Stowe v. 
Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 (2nd Cir. 1978); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 279 (2d Cir. 
1974)). 
186 See Zhang, 2009 WL 4430297, at *3 (“ECPA did not amend the portion of the Wiretap 
Act that made no provision for obtaining authorization for wiretaps in a foreign country, nor did 
ECPA, in amending the Wiretap Act and creating the SCA, reference in any manner activities 
occurring outside the United States.”). 
187 See ‘60 Minutes’ Report: How Online Gamblers Unmasked Cheaters, CNET.COM (Nov. 30, 
2008), http://news.cnet.com/60-minutes-report-how-online-gamblers-unmasked-cheaters 
(reporting that members of the Mohawk Kahnawake nation register and service “more than 60% of 
the world’s Internet gaming activity”). 
188 Gmail Usage Per Country, APPAPPEAL.COM, http://www.appappeal.com/maps/gmail (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
189 See id. 
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Country     Percentage of Gmail Users 
United States       30.0% 
India          8.8% 
Brazil         3.3% 
Russia         3.2% 
United Kingdom      2.9% 
Japan         2.6% 
Iran         2.4% 
China          1.4% 
 
Facebook’s user base is even more foreign than Gmail’s. To be sure, us-
ing Facebook has become as American as apple pie: about 54 percent of 
Americans presently have a Facebook account.190 At the same time, only 
about 16 percent of Facebook’s users are located in the United States.191 The 
rest access Facebook from abroad. For U.S.-based services like Gmail and 
Facebook, U.S. users form only a small subset of its overall global customer 
base.  
The friction between the territorial ECPA and the global Internet cre-
ates two major puzzles that ECPA’s drafters could not have foreseen. First, 
what does it mean for ECPA to apply only inside the territory of the 
United States? In today’s networked environment, company headquarters 
can be located in one country; employees with access to the data can be 
located in a second country; the data can reside in a third country; and the 
party seeking access to the company’s data could be located in a fourth 
country. Of course, all of the data could be easily sent electronically from 
any place in the world to any other place. So what determines territoriality? 
The location of the data? The company? The employee? Or the requesting 
party?192 Imagine a person in Mexico who seeks the emails of another 
person in Mexico, and he does so by contacting employees in France who 
work for an Internet company headquartered in Belgium that hosts its 
 
190 Quentin Fottrell, Facebook Loses 1.4 Million Active Users in U.S., MARKETWATCH ( J an. 
15, 2013), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2013-01-15/finance/36346107_1_active-users-facebook-
social-media. 
191 Id. (reporting that about 167 million of Facebook’s one billion users are located in the 
United States as of January 2013). 
192 Courts have encountered similar questions while identifying the location of an intercept 
under the Wiretap Act for purposes of obtaining a wiretap order in a particular district. See 
United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a judge in Wisconsin was 
statutorily authorized to order a wiretap on a cellular phone regardless of whether the phone or 
listening post was located in Wisconsin). 
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servers in the United States. If the company discloses the records, is that 
disclosure inside the United States for purposes of ECPA? Does it matter if 
the French employees first have the data emailed to them and then disclose 
the communications from France to Mexico? ECPA offers no answers to 
such questions.  
Indeed, the very idea of online data being located in a particular physical 
“place” is becoming rapidly outdated. From the standpoint of network 
design, a person’s email files could be fragmented and the underlying data 
located in many places around the world.193 The emails could only exist in 
recognizable form when they are assembled remotely. That assembly could 
occur anywhere at the direction of someone who could be located anywhere 
else. If the location of the stored data governs under ECPA, what is the 
location of emails that were stored in fragments all around the world?  
A second puzzle created by the mismatch of the territorial statute and 
the global Internet is how the statute deals with foreign government access. 
The frequency by which services like Gmail are used by individuals outside 
the United States explains why foreign governments often seek access to 
records or contents held by U.S.-based service providers concerning 
individuals abroad. Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Suzlon Energy Ltd. 
v. Microsoft Corp.,194 the location of the customer or subscriber has no 
bearing on that individual’s ECPA rights.195 Individuals outside the United 
States who use Gmail from abroad have the same statutory rights as U.S. 
citizens using the service from inside the United States.  
At the same time, foreign governments often believe that their local 
priorities and local laws should control. For example, in 2007, prosecutors in 
Belgium brought criminal charges against the U.S.-based provider Yahoo! 
for its failure to disclose records sought about customers in the Netherlands 
whom Belgian prosecutors suspected of criminal activity. 196  Yahoo!’s 
 
193 Vivek Mohan & John Villasenor, Decrypting the Fifth Amendment: The Limits of Self-
Incrimination in the Digital Era, 15 U. PA. J. CON. L. HEIGHT. SCRUTINY 11, 20-21 (2012) (“Google 
Docs or Amazon’s cloud-based simple storage service . . . might sometimes choose to store 
multiple copies of a document, or to partition a single copy of the document into separately stored 
fragments.”). 
194 671 F.3d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he plain language of ECPA extends its protections 
to noncitizens. The Court is therefore obligated to enforce the statute as written.”). 
195 Id. at 729-30. 
196 Tanguy Van Overstraeten & Ronan Tigner, Belgium–Yahoo! Saga Continues: Yahoo! Must 
Not Hand Over Personal Data to the Public Prosecutor, LINKLATERS ( J an. 30, 2012), 
http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Publication1403Newsletter/TMT-Newsletter-January-
2012/Pages/9_Belgium-Yahoo!-saga-continues-Yahoo-personal-data-public-prosecutor.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
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defense was based in part on ECPA. According to Yahoo!, it was a U.S. 
provider governed by U.S. law. The criminal case against Yahoo! is still 
pending in the Belgian courts,197 but the lesson is clear: the global Internet 
requires privacy laws that account for the demands of governments around 
the world rather than just the United States. 
What rules currently apply when a foreign government approaches a 
U.S.-based provider and demands information for a foreign investigation 
about a foreign user? In its current form, ECPA does not recognize foreign 
governments as governments at all. Government entities are defined as 
“department[s] or agenc[ies] of the United States or any State or political 
subdivision thereof,”198 thus excluding foreign governments. This means 
that foreign governments cannot obtain mandatory process using foreign 
court orders.199 Further, the presumptive ban on the disclosure of contents 
of communications will apply to disclosure sought by foreign governments 
just as it does to disclosure sought by private entities.200 At the same time, 
because ECPA permits providers to disclose noncontent information to 
nongovernment entities,201 providers can disclose noncontent information 
to foreign governments at their discretion. As a practical matter, then, 
foreign governments can often obtain noncontent information using foreign 
court orders. The providers have a choice to disclose the information or not, 
and they may do so in response to a legitimate court order even though the 
order is not binding in the United States.  
The picture is more complicated when foreign governments seek con-
tent information. Four basic options exist. The first option is for foreign 
governments to work with the U.S. government and to use Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties or letters rogatory to seek information from providers 
using official diplomatic channels.202 This process generally remains slow 
and laborious, as it requires the cooperation of two governments and one of 
those governments may not prioritize the case as highly as the other.203  
A second option is for foreign governments to persuade U.S. officials to 
open a domestic investigation and obtain U.S. court orders that are binding 
 
197 Id. 
198 See 18 U.S.C. § 2711(4) (2006). 
199 See id. § 2703 (providing means of compelling information for government entities). 
200 See id. § 2702(a)–(b) (drawing no distinction between private entities and foreign gov-
ernments for purposes of limiting the voluntary disclosures of customer communications by 
providers). 
201 See id. § 2702(c)(6) (permitting disclosure of noncontent information “to any person 
other than a governmental entity”). 
202 See generally ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 752-59 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing 
the legal regime for letters rogatory and mutual legal assistance in computer crime cases). 
203 Id. 
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in the United States. Domestic officials can then turn over the fruits of the 
court orders to the foreign authorities. The procedure can be very quick, but 
it requires the foreign crime to also be a U.S. offense.204 Further, it requires 
U.S. investigative authorities to approve of the investigation and consider it 
a sufficient priority (either to further its own interests or to advance comity 
interests in cooperation) to merit the use of U.S. resources.  
The third option is that a provider could design the network so that a 
copy of the communication exists outside the United States where ECPA 
does not apply. For example, the provider could create a policy by which 
users who register their accounts from outside the United States have copies 
of their accounts stored outside the United States as a matter of course. If 
foreign governments approach the provider seeking to obtain the communi-
cations, the copy will already exist outside the United States. It seems likely 
that ECPA would not apply, and the communication can be accessed under 
the laws of the country in which the copy is retained.  
The fourth option is legally dubious but nonetheless worth mentioning: 
a provider might store the communications in the United States and then 
export the data to a representative or an affiliate outside the United States 
when foreign legal process is served. As soon as the data is outside the 
United States, the representative or affiliate can disclose the data under the 
rationale that the disclosure is no longer inside the United States and 
therefore no longer regulated by ECPA. This option is likely unlawful 
because it merely breaks the unlawful disclosure into two steps. It would be 
surprising if providers could circumvent ECPA’s territorial limits on 
disclosing contents without a court order by first emailing it to a corporate 
representative abroad. There are no decisions on the issue, however, and the 
distinction between designing a network so that copies are abroad to 
facilitate legal process and simply sending a copy abroad in response to legal 
process is a tricky one. ECPA simply was not written with the territoriality 
problem in mind.  
 
204 Notably, U.S. criminal laws have been expanded extraterritorially to enable U.S. assis-
tance to foreign governments. By making a foreign crime also a crime inside the United States, 
investigators in the United States can open a domestic investigation and assist foreign govern-
ments when evidence happens to be located inside the United States. See Computer Crime and 
Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), Field Guidance on New Authorities that Relate to Computer 
Crime and Electronic Evidence Enacted in the USA Patriot Act of 2001, CYBERCRIME.GOV (Nov. 5, 
2001), http://web.archive.org/web/20011204213823/ (discussing the extraterritorial expansion of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as a way to assist foreign computer crime investigations). 
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III.  CRAFTING A NEXT GENERATION PRIVACY ACT 
If Congress could start from scratch and enact a new privacy statute, 
what would that statute look like? This Part argues that a new privacy 
statute should be based on four principles. First, Congress should impose a 
uniform requirement for compelled access to remotely stored contents held 
for a customer or subscriber. Second, Congress should create a particularity 
requirement for compelled access to noncontent information. Third, 
Congress should impose minimization rules on all contents of communica-
tions obtained by investigators. And fourth, Congress should impose a 
territoriality regime based on the location of the user, such as one that 
provides full protections for users based in the United States and a permis-
sive regime of disclosure to foreign legal process for users based abroad.  
A.  Congress Should Enact a Uniform Requirement for Access to Any Remotely 
Stored Contents Held by or for a Customer or Subscriber 
The first principle of the new statute should be the imposition of a uni-
form set of rules to govern access to contents held by or for a customer or 
subscriber. The core theme animating the electronic privacy statute is the 
problem of third party control. Users of computer networks necessarily 
place information in the control of others. The new statute should confer a 
single legal standard for access to the contents of data held by or for a 
customer or subscriber.  
This approach would abolish the existing distinctions between protec-
tions against real-time access, currently covered by the Wiretap Act, and 
the regulation of stored access, which is presently covered by the Stored 
Communications Act. As explained in Part II, the low storage cost of 
electronic information has led to a convergence between the privacy 
implications of real-time and stored access. The new statute should treat 
them in the same way and impose the same standard on them. Eliminating 
the distinction between real-time and stored access is also more practical 
because the distinction is famously difficult to apply for computer and 
Internet communications. Courts have struggled to articulate just how 
quickly and how often access needs to occur for the court to treat it as 
“contemporaneous” and therefore analyze it under the Wiretap Act.205 
Under my proposed approach, this metaphysical line would be eliminated. 
My approach also eliminates the existing ECS/RCS distinction and im-
poses a uniform standard for all providers. All third-party storage of 
 
205 See LAFAVE, supra note 2, at § 4.6(b). 
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communications should lead to the same protection, regardless of whether 
the provider acts as an email host, a cloud provider, or a search engine. The 
problem of third-party storage is a general one. In all of these cases, a user 
shares the contents of their private communications with a third-party 
service that is not the intended human recipient of the message. In all of 
these settings, users should receive the same privacy protections against 
disclosure by the third-party services about their communications. All 
providers should be covered by the same rule. At the very least, the pre-
sumption should be that the same level of privacy protection applies 
regardless of the means of access. Deviations from that norm should require 
significant justification. 
Of course, harmonization requires identifying the uniform standard by 
which contents would be obtained. Standards might be harmonized up, 
harmonized down, or harmonized somewhere in the middle. I have argued 
elsewhere that the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires a probable cause 
warrant for government-compelled access to contents, 206  and that the 
traditional Fourth Amendment standard provides one natural starting 
point. The “super warrant” standard imposed for real-time wiretapping 
confers the highest statutory protection under criminal surveillance laws 
and provides a second possible point of reference.207 Because this Article is 
a thought experiment, I will not attempt to answer where the line should be 
drawn. Wherever the line is drawn, existing technology counsels in favor of 
a uniform standard for compelled access to contents.  
B.  Particularity Requirements for Noncontent Data Should Be Imposed, Perhaps 
Based on a Concept of Customer-hours 
The second principle of the new statute should be the adoption of par-
ticularity requirements. Outside of the Wiretap Act, ECPA pays no 
attention to particularity because few records existed that could be collected 
when the statute was enacted. The amount of data available was sufficiently 
limited that scale played little role. That is no longer true. Today the 
default has become that all data is stored. As a result, the threshold question 
of how much cause the government must demonstrate to obtain information 
 
206 See Kerr, Internetsupra note 136, at 1029-31 (arguing that contents are the online equiva-
lent of real-world “inside” information, and should therefore be covered by the Fourth Amend-
ment). 
207 See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 9, 80-84 (2004) (arguing that Internet surveillance should adopt the highly 
protective standards of the Wiretap Act). 
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should be followed by a second question of how much information can be 
obtained when that cause has been established.  
It helps to divide the proper approach to particularity into two parts: 
contents and noncontent information. In the case of contents, the Constitu-
tion already requires the government to satisfy traditional Fourth Amend-
ment particularity concerns.208 Although statutory particularity could be 
imposed, the Fourth Amendment protections already exist and should serve 
that function. The harder question, and the one that is more important for 
purposes of a new statute, is what kind of particularity requirement the law 
should impose for noncontent information, which is not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.209  
Identifying the proper particularity standard for noncontent information 
is difficult because such records exist in many different forms. Some 
noncontent records are more sensitive than others. A list of every email 
address that a person emailed, together with the time each email was sent, is 
more sensitive than merely the name on the account. Further, as the 
example of cell tower dumps reveals, investigators often want records from 
many different users at once. As a result, particularity might impose limits 
on the number or type of records the government may request from a 
particular user or from a range of users. The question is, what principle 
should Congress use to limit the scope of noncontent records access? Should 
it be the overall number of records collected, perhaps with limitations on 
the number of records obtained per order? Or perhaps limitations should be 
imposed based on the number of accounts obtained?  
There is no perfect answer to this question. However, one approach to 
particularity worth considering for noncontent information is the concept of 
customer-hours. In an environment of widespread and detailed recordkeep-
ing, a helpful way to measure the scope of access to metadata is by identify-
ing the length of time for which a customer used the service. If providers 
collect everything, the time over which the collection occurs most effective-
ly identifies the scope of the metadata collected. Further, if the government 
may need the records of multiple users, the invasion of privacy grows with 
the number of users whose records are collected. Imposing a particularity 
requirement based on a defined maximum number of customer-hours may 
provide the best way to limit the scope of noncontent records accessed. 
 
208 See, e.g., In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email 
Address, Nos. 12-8119, 12--8191, 2012 WL 4383917, at *4-5 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012) (applying 
Fourth Amendment protections to emails and faxes). Of course, Congress could enforce a 
particularity limit that is more restrictive than the constitutional limit. 
209 See supra Section I.C. 
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An illustration can help explain how such a particularity requirement 
would work. Imagine that Congress sets the threshold for access to noncon-
tent records using a standard akin to the existing 2703(d) standard: to obtain 
a court order for disclosure, the government must present “specific and 
articulable facts” suggesting that the records disclosed would be “relevant 
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”210 Congress could then 
impose a particularity limit of a specific number of customer-hours for each 
court order. Imagine that a single order is capped at 500 customer-hours. If 
the government satisfies the threshold showing of cause, it can obtain all the 
noncontent records for a single user for 500 hours, the equivalent of about 
21 days. Alternatively, the government could ask for the records of two 
customers for 250 hours each, or five users for 100 hours each. We can also 
apply this approach in the context of a cell tower dump. A cell tower dump 
might reveal records from 1000 customers. In that case, the particularity 
limitation of 500 customer-hours would restrict the government’s access to 
30 minutes of time. If the government sought information from more 
towers, or chose towers with especially high usage, the government could 
still obtain the order, but only for an even shorter time window.211  
C.  Minimization Rules Should Apply to All Obtained  
Contents of Communications 
The next principle that the new statute should reflect is that minimiza-
tion principles from the Wiretap Act should apply when accessing all 
contents. Existing law adopts a bifurcated privacy regime. Under the 
Wiretap Act, lawful access to communications comes with strings at-
tached.212 Even after obtaining a lawful wiretap order, agents are required to 
screen communications ex ante and then carefully limit disclosure ex post.213 
Under the SCA, a court order requires the provider to supply the govern-
ment with the entire contents of the account. The government is then free 
to look through all of this material.  
This was understandable back when few Internet communications were 
stored. But in a world of total storage, the absence of legal rules on minimi-
zation has become an anomaly. Every collection of contents should impose 
 
210 18 U.S.C § 2703(d) (2006). 
211 Of course, there could be implementation issues with this standard if the number of indi-
viduals involved were unknown or varied considerably over time. Nonetheless, the customer-hours 
approach offers at least a rough way to impose a particularity requirement.  
212 See supra Section I.B. 
213 See supra Section I.B. 
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the same minimization requirements regardless of whether they involve 
access to real-time or stored communications. Importantly, the concept of 
minimization need not mirror its application in the telephone setting. Here, 
the Senate Report accompanying ECPA was remarkably prescient. In the 
course of explaining how the minimization requirement might apply to 
wiretaps of computer communications, the report states: 
It is impossible to “listen” to a computer and determine when to stop listen-
ing and minimize as it is possible to do in listening to a telephone conversa-
tion. For instance, a page displayed on a screen during a computer 
transmission might have five paragraphs of which the second and third are 
relevant to the investigation and the others are not. The printing technolo-
gy is such that the whole page including the irrelevant paragraphs, would 
have to be printed and read, before anything can be done about minimiza-
tion.  
 
Thus, minimization for computer transmissions would require a somewhat 
different procedure than that used to minimize a telephone call. Common 
sense would dictate, and it is the Committee’s intention, that the minimiza-
tion should be conducted by the initial law enforcement officials who review 
the transcript. Those officials would delete all non-relevant materials and 
disseminate to other officials only that information which is relevant to the 
investigation.214  
As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, minimization for electronic com-
munications requires filtering.215 Someone must go through the records and 
find the pertinent communications. The details of how minimization should 
be performed are not my focus here, but some kind of minimization stand-
ard should apply to the review of protected contents.216  
 
214 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 31 (1986). 
215 See United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We interpret Con-
gress’s ‘common sense’ idea of electronic minimization to mean that law enforcement in some 
circumstances may look at every communication. Congress intended that the pool of investigative 
material be filtered.”). 
216 I have argued elsewhere that the plain view exception should not apply to digital evidence 
searches, including searches through contents of communications obtained from third-party 
providers. See Kerr, Internetsupra note 136, at 1047-48 (“I would incorporate a proposal I have made 
in the context of stand-alone computers to eliminate the plain view exception for Internet 
searches.”). I continue to adhere to that view, although I will not repeat the argument here. 
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D.  Congress Could Establish a Two-Part User-Based Regime for Territoriality 
The fourth and final principle of a next generation privacy act would be 
the establishment of an explicit regime for the territoriality of the statute 
and the mechanisms for foreign government access. Congress could do this 
in several ways. The many options reflect the several major variables that 
govern territoriality, including the location of the information, the location 
of the user, and the location of the company that hosts the information. 
Further, Congress must decide how to treat foreign government access. 
Congress could allow U.S.-based companies to disclose communications or 
records pursuant to foreign government orders, or it could require govern-
ments to comply with Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties instead. Alterna-
tively, Congress could regulate territoriality by adopting express rules as to 
when providers can or must design their networks in ways that go outside 
U.S. territory to subject communications to foreign government access.  
Based on existing technology, the best available option is to focus priva-
cy protections on the perceived location of the user. Providers usually have 
a rough sense of the locations of their customers.217 Users often can select a 
language, and they also reveal IP addresses every time they access a provid-
er’s services. IP addresses can be manipulated, of course, but it is often 
possible to gauge the rough location of a user from the IP address used to 
access the network.218 The combination of language and IP address gives 
providers a general sense of the country used to access their network by 
each customer.219  
A rule based on the location of the user is far from ideal. Some custom-
ers access services from multiple countries.220 Others access services using 
anonymized IP addresses, making their location difficult to identify. 
Nonetheless, providers generally can separate out at least most of their 
U.S.-based customers from customers in other countries. And if user 
location can be difficult to identify, the remaining options seem worse. In a 
 
217 See, e.g., Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of 
Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 567, 586-99 (2012) (discussing how 
geolocation tools, which currently use IP addresses, can be used to determine an Internet user’s 
physical location). 
218 See id. at 594-97 (examining the reliability of IP addresses for geolocation). 
219 See id. at 597 (explaining that “combinations of methods” yield more accurate results than 
relying on IP addresses alone). 
220 For example, a user might travel around the world, accessing the network from various 
places. In that case, it may be difficult or impossible to definitively associate the person with a 
particular home country. At the same time, the use of defaults may solve this problem. For 
example, the law could presume that a user of a U.S.-based service is located in the United States 
unless the evidence indicates otherwise with some clarity. 
  
2014] The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act 417 
global network, the location of data is arbitrary and increasingly unknowa-
ble. The location of the company holding data is equally arbitrary and 
difficult to know, given that multinational companies can have affiliates and 
branches anywhere. A standard based on perceived user location is prob-
lematic, but it seems less problematic than the alternatives.  
Moreover, difficulties in identifying location can be addressed through 
presumptions and standards of proof. For example, the default rule might 
be that a person is presumed to be inside the United States unless there is 
clear and convincing evidence that the user is outside the United States. 
The standard could also incorporate a time element, looking to the person’s 
location over the previous month or year to determine where the person is 
located. None of these standards would be perfect, but they may provide a 
way to implement a location-based standard in a way that makes such an 
approach better than the alternatives. 
Focusing on user location could enable a two-part solution to the territo-
riality problem along the following lines. First, Internet providers that are 
either based in the United States or that are doing business in the United 
States would be required to follow U.S. privacy law with respect to their 
U.S.-based users. That requirement would apply regardless of where 
information is technically stored. Under my proposal, privacy protections 
should follow the user instead of the data: all state or federal government 
access to information about U.S.-based users should comply with U.S. law. 
So long as a company with a presence in the United States has communica-
tions belonging to U.S.-based customers, that company should have to 
follow U.S. law imposing a warrant requirement on access. Internet provid-
ers in the United States would therefore be free to design their network to 
optimize the engineering problem of storage and service without worrying 
about the implications for the privacy of their U.S.-based users. Users in 
the United States would also know that their use of U.S.-based services 
would receive the full protection of U.S. law. 
The second part of the solution would focus on the rights of users based 
outside of the United States. For those users, the law should allow, but not 
require, Internet providers to disclose contents and noncontent information 
pursuant to the foreign legal process in the country associated with the user. 
If French authorities in France produce a valid court order pertaining to a 
French user, U.S.-based providers should be permitted to comply with the 
order. This approach would place some burden on providers that service 
foreign customers, as it would require them to learn enough about foreign 
legal process to understand foreign court orders. More importantly, howev-
er, disclosure would be permissive rather than mandatory. Providers that 
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chose not to comply with foreign court orders would not be required to do 
so, allowing providers to opt out of foreign disclosure if they wished. 
Enacting a regime of permissive disclosure for foreign legal process per-
taining to foreign users provides important flexibility given the wide range 
of different legal standards and foreign governments. If disclosure were 
made mandatory, a totalitarian government with no privacy laws could force 
U.S.-based providers to disclose contents pertaining to democratic activists 
and critics of the regime. On the other hand, if disclosure were forbidden, 
even democratic governments with highly protective privacy laws would be 
forced to always go through cumbersome legal processes such as letters 
rogatory and MLATs to obtain records in routine cases.  
A permissive regime would allow U.S.-based providers to choose which 
countries should be deemed sufficiently protective and democratic to have 
their legal process honored.221 And because that legal process would only 
apply to users located in the country where the user is located, the law 
would both protect U.S.-based users and permit providers to be confident 
that they were disclosing foreign records appropriately in each case. 
More broadly, a user-focused solution to territoriality recognizes the 
inherently global nature of today’s Internet. It no longer makes sense to 
think of data as being in a particular “place” given that data can be sent 
anywhere or stored in pieces around the world. In contrast, users remain 
rooted in the physical world and are governed by the sovereign interests of 
the countries in which they are located. Hinging privacy protections on the 
location of the user would ensure that users receive the same localized 
protections in the cloud that they do in their homes.  
CONCLUSION 
Congress rarely enacts sweeping reforms. Slow evolutionary change 
ruffles fewer feathers than does wholesale revision. If Congress could enact 
a new privacy law today, however, the rapid pace of technological change 
since 1986 would lead to a rather different set of statutory privacy laws than 
those that presently exist. The law would adopt a single uniform standard 
for access to contents, focus much more on particularity and minimization, 
and deal explicitly with the problem of extraterritoriality.  
 
221 Providers likely would not welcome this choice, as it encourages foreign governments to 
pressure them to disclose and requires providers to make difficult calls. It may prove difficult for a 
provider to refuse compliance with court orders in countries where that provider has a business 
presence.  
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Whether or not Congress is able to enact a wholesale revision of the 
privacy laws, it should realize that substantial reform will likely be needed 
in our lifetimes. The first federal surveillance law was the Communications 
Act of 1934. It was replaced by the Wiretap Act 1968, which was supple-
mented considerably by ECPA in 1986. Since that time, communications 
networks have become significantly more important to American life. The 
incredible growth of the Internet and its rapid transformation from a toy to 
an essential part of daily life has made the accuracy and timeliness of the 
electronic privacy laws more important than ever before.  
The vital importance of computers and the Internet tasks Congress with 
keeping the privacy laws up to date. Today’s Internet has diverged in 
profound ways from the Internet that existed when Congress last enacted 
major reform. Whether Congress acts in piecemeal fashion or starts from 
scratch, the statutory privacy laws should reflect the privacy threats and 
government practices of the present instead of the past.  
 
